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Abstract
This paper conducts the analysis of conﬂict and appropriation by extending the static
contest models such as Hirshleifer (1991, 1995) and Skaperdas (1992) to a continuous-
time, diﬀerential game setting. This paper shows that there is a unique Markov perfect
equilibrium (MPE) strategy, which may be linear or nonlinear depending on the struc-
tural parameters of the model, when strategies are deﬁned over the entire state space.
We show that ‘partial cooperation’ can be seen as a long-run response to conﬂict. In
particular, we ﬁnd that a decrease in the eﬀectiveness of appropriation, the depreciation
rate of a common-pool stock which is subject to appropriation or the rate of time prefer-
ences or an increase in the ‘degree of noise’ improves the degree of ‘partial cooperation’
and thus the welfare of an anarchic society in the long run.
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Conﬂict and appropriation are increasingly gaining attention among economists as a power-
ful force driving human interactions. In reality economic agents not only engage in purely
economic activities like production, consumption or exchange, but also sometimes allocate
resources to conﬂict as well as to appropriation activities in order to capture what others have
produced or to secure certain rents. There is a relatively small but growing literature in polit-
ical economics initiated by Hirshleifer (1991, 1995), Skaperdas (1992) and Grossman and Kim
(1995) which allows for the possibility of conﬂict and appropriation in economic interactions.
Their models share four common features. First, they postulate that conﬂict arises from the
choice of rational and self-interested agents. Second, a well-deﬁned and enforced property
right over, at least, some goods do not exist. Third, the agents are assumed to be myopic
in a way that they maximize only the current payoﬀ. Fourth, their models are static. This
paper conducts the analysis of conﬂict and appropriation by extending their static models to
a dynamic one.
Hirshleifer (1995) takes an initial step towards a dynamic approach by recognizing succes-
sive iterations of the one-shot game, and focuses on the convergent point of such iterations
(he calls such a ﬁxed point “a steady state”). Nevertheless, as Maxwell and Reuveny (2005,
p.31) correctly point out, “However, this approach is not fully dynamic: it does not specify
equations of motion for any variables, time is not a variable in the model, and the condition
for dynamic stability is not derived based on standard dynamic analysis”.
In response to such long-term desires, there have been several papers which attempt to con-
struct a dynamic variation of the one-shot conﬂicting game analyzed by the above-mentioned
authors. Garﬁnkel (1990) examines a dynamic model in which agents make choices between
productive and ﬁghting activities. She uses a repeated game setting where threats and pun-
ishments are available. Existence of cooperative, disarmament equilibria can be established
using Folk Theorem arguments. Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996) discuss a two-period model
of conﬂict in which time-dependence is introduced by the assumption that second period re-
sources of each agent are increasing in ﬁrst-period’s payoﬀ. As a result, “the shadow of the
1future” may impede the possibilities for cooperation. In other words, competing agents engage
more in appropriation in order to capture a bigger share of today’s pie. The equilibrium solu-
tion concept we employ in this paper allows us to identify possible cooperative outcomes as a
result of decentralized decision-making by rational and forward-looking agents, without having
to rely on the Folk Theorem of repeated games or enforceable commitments.1 Moreover, since
the one-shot game is repeated every period due to the nature of the repeated game, it would be
unsatisfactory to describe true dynamic situations which are not “stationary”. More recently,
Maxwell and Reuveny (2005) construct a conﬂict model with two competing groups in which
each group’s population and a stock of common (natural) resources both change over time.
Since three non-linear diﬀerential equations characterizing the dynamic paths of these stock
variables do not allow for an analytical solution, they resort to numerical simulations. These
exercises reveal that mild appropriation activity depresses the use of natural resources for
production, thus possibly creating a Pareto improvement compared to cooperative situations
where there is no appropriation activity, and, moreover, tends to reduce the volatility of those
stocks through the transition. Although their model generates interesting insights, they still
assume that agents are myopic. The authors in the literature have called for a full dynamic
and multi-period model of the Skaperdas-Hirshleifer based literature which incorporates the
behavior of non-myopic agents who are taking into account the consequences of their future
actions.2 More recently, Hafer (2006) develops a large-population inﬁnite-horizon dynamic
game in which players are randomly matched in each period to play the war of attrition. She
shows that although the distribution of types among the winners and losers changes with each
1According to the so-called Folk Theorem, if players are suﬃciently patient in inﬁnitely repeated games, any
outcome that is feasible and individual rational could be realized as an equilibrium outcome. Such multiplicity
of equilibria would lose the predictability of the equilibrium outcome. Although even in the literature on
diﬀerential games, cooperative behavior has been investigated based on non-Markovian trigger strategies (see,
e.g., Benhabib and Radner, 1992; Dockner et al., 2000, Chap.6), we do not adopt this approach here.
2More recently, there is another class of dynamic conﬂict models that include, e.g., Gradstein (2004) and
Gonzalez (2007), and Tornell and Lane (1999). There are several important diﬀerences between the models
in their papers and ours. First, in their models a ﬂo wo ft h eo u t p u tp r o d u c e de a c hp e r i o di ss u b j e c tt o
predation, while in our model a stock variable is subject to predation. Secondly and more importantly, those
papers investigate the relationship between conﬂict and economic growth in the standard growth model based
explicitly on the investment and saving decisions of a large number of agents. Hence, their models are mostly
concerned with the macroeconomic consequences, such as growth eﬀects of insecure property rights. Since
our model is a straightforward dynamic extension of Grossman, Hershleifer and Skaperdas which allows for
interaction among a small number of agents, it enables us to directly compare our results with those of their
static conﬂict models and thus to highlight the strategic role of appropriation among those few agents in the
intertemporal context.
2round of conﬂict, in a steady state there is no conﬂict. Although the motivation is the same
as ours, she has to use the model of the war of attrition between two players because she
has assumed that there is only one, indivisible parcel of land. This assumption signiﬁcantly
distinguishes their model from the models of Skaperdas and Hirshleifer in which a prize is
divisible and the war of attrition never takes place.
We develop a forward-looking agent-based inﬁnite horizon, general-equilibrium model to
study the dynamic evolution of self-enforcing property rights. There are various ways of
extending one-shot, static models of Skaperdas and Hirshleifer to a dynamic setting. Following
their models, we ﬁrst assume that the initial resource endowment is ﬁxed over time. This
assumption would be defended either by interpreting the initial resource endowment as a time
or labor supply, or by assuming the ﬁxed population in order to keep the model tractable. The
relevant state variable in our dynamic model is a durable stock which accumulates through
time according to the production process using collective eﬀorts of all parties involved. This
durable stock is exhaustible or rival in the sense that one agent’s use of the stock does diminish
its availability to other agents, and is also open to appropriation by rivals due to the lack
of well-deﬁned or enforceable property rights. Hence each of the agents is tempted by the
immediate beneﬁt attainable from capturing the stock. Natural (renewable) resources such as
ﬁshes and forest, and land in primitive historical societies are examples of such durable stocks
or disputed wealth. In order to acquire land, people develop land through cooperative eﬀorts,
while they can also seize it from others. The stock of knowledge is another example.
We model the incentives of agents to exert eﬀo r ti na na t t e m p tt oc h a l l e n g et h ec l a i m s
of others. All agents who succumb to the temptation reduce their help in production of the
common-pool stock to increase their eﬀorts to convert claims on the common stock into ef-
fective property rights. More speciﬁcally, agents derive a payoﬀ (or utility) from owning the
stock of durable goods and, at every moment in time, choose how to allocate an endowment
between appropriation of the common-pool stock (creating property rights) and participat-
ing in the production process to accumulate the common-pool stock. The production and
appropriation decisions made independently and noncooperatively by each of the agents end
up determining the evolution of the open-accessible stock. We use a tractable version of a
3diﬀerential game formulation of this model of conﬂict between several agents who attempt
to appropriate a common-pool durable stock over an inﬁnite horizon. The solution concept
employed is a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), restricting strategies to be functions of
the current payoﬀ-relevant state variable. The key to determining which describe equilibrium
outcomes is subgame perfection over the entire state space [0,∞), and not for its subset.3
The results obtained in this paper are summarized as follows. First, there uniquely exists
either a linear, singular MPE or a nonlinear, non-singular MPE strategy. More precisely,
depending on the structural parameter values of the model, either of the strategies, which
can be extended by corner solutions to the entire state space, is qualiﬁed as MPE strategies.
This uniqueness property of MPE strategies stems from the requirement that the domain
of a state variable must be deﬁned over the entire state space. This requirement plays an
essential role in reﬁning equilibria as well as associated steady states without appealing strict
concave objectives unlike the static contest models. Second, both solutions commonly reveal
that initially poor countries will exhibit an increase in appropriation as the aggregate stock of
durable good gets larger until a steady state is reached. On the other hand, in economies with
an aﬄuent endowment of natural resources the “marginal gain (or utility)” of appropriation
is higher and thus agents substitute appropriation for production for a while until the state
variable reaches a threshold level. From that threshold onwards, agents choose to engage
in production activity to some extent until a steady state is reached where the output of
production is only just suﬃcient to replace the stock of durable goods. This result relates to
the observation that rent-seeking activities in rich countries may result in deindustrialization
as suggested by the literature on the resource curse (e.g., Sachs and Warner, 1999).4
Fourth, in the long run (=steady state) property rights may be “partially” enforced in the
sense that appropriation and productive activities coexist, so that neither a totally peaceful
(disarmed) equilibrium nor a full-ﬁghting equilibrium emerges as a long run stable outcome.
3Nevertheless, there is a literature that has not required strategies to have the standard game-theoretical
meaning. This has odd theoretical foundations–at best–either requiring endogenously deﬁned domains (see
Tsutsui and Mino, 1990), or not requiring that strategies be deﬁned for every possible subgames (see Itaya and
Shimomura, 2001; Rubio and Casino, 2002). In this paper strategies are deﬁned in the standard game-theoretic
sense; that is, strategies should be deﬁned over “the entire state space” which may possibly be joined with
corner strategies.
4There is the evidence that resource abundance in the deﬁnition used by Sachs and Warner (1999) is
associated with civil war (e.g., Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004).
4Moreover, the less the productivity of conﬂict technology, the more patient the contenders, the
less the rate of depreciation, or the less sensitive to appropriative eﬀort the conﬂict technology,
the less each contender is to undertake appropriation, and thus the greater are the degree of
partially cooperation as well as the welfare of an anarchic society.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section we formulate the model
and state all assumptions. In Section 3 we characterize Markov Perfect Equilibrium strategies.
In Section 4 we conduct comparative static analysis with respect to several principle struc-
tural parameters, and then designs institutions or policies which make the non-cooperative
solution closer to a ﬁrst-best (i.e., cooperative) solution. Section 5 concludes the paper. Some
mathematical proofs will be given in the appendices.
2 The Model
2.1 Analytical Framework
Consider an inﬁnite horizon economy populated by n ≥ 2 agents (or contenders) who strate-
gically interact. Each of the contenders derives utility from the consumption or services of a
common-pool asset, such as land territories, natural resources, or the tangible or intangible
stock of durables. We want our model to capture the role of productive and aggressive activi-
ties with the understanding that aggressive investment causes an inward shift of the aggregate
production possibility frontier. Accordingly, we use a setup where appropriation and produc-
tion are two substitutable investment choices. Speciﬁcally, let contender i decide at each point
in time, t, how much resources to devote for appropriation ai(t) ≥ 0 and production li(t) ≥ 0.




5where the time-invariant endowment is normalized at 1,a n di snot subject to appropriation.5
The time arguments have been suppressed in this and all subsequent equations except when
it is strictly necessary.
The common-pool stock is subject to appropriation. The stock is generated by accu-













which captures the idea that higher productive eﬀorts by contenders cause an outward shift
of the production possibility frontier for the economy as a whole. The output of production
can be stored to augment the common-pool stock. However, storage entails costs such that








where δ ∈ (0,1) is the rate at which output will depreciate if stored for future consumption, and
˙ Z denotes a change of Z(t) over time.
A main ingredient of the model is the conﬂict technology which, for any given values
of a1,...,a n, determines each contender’s probability of winning sole possession in obtaining
the stock Z(t) in a given period. To model this probability for contender i, a natural assump-
tion is that the probability is increasing in i’s aggressive investment, i.e., the fraction of time
i devotes to aggression, but decreasing in the sum of aggressive investment of all contenders.
To represent the relative success of i in the contest, therefore, we will use the following conﬂict
5In the existing literature on conﬂict and appropriation the assumption that each agent has some essential
property rights is standard. Individual’s labor supply is such an example. Maxwell and Reuveny (2005) further
assume that the amount of labor supply is growing over time as a result of the growth of population. However,
to avoid unnecessary complications, we assume that the population of agents remains constant through time.
6The production function may be generalized to the CES production function. Nevertheless, such general-
ization does not essentially alter the result without complications.














i ∈ [0,1], (4)
where the parameter r captures the eﬀectiveness of aggression and η > 0.8 The role of a
positive constant number η is to prevent pi (.) from being discontinuous at point (0,...,0).
As will be seen, if the model is to allow the possibility that the equilibrium values of all ai’s
equal zero, then the function pi (.) is either discontinuous or undeﬁn e do np o i n t(0,...,0) when
η =0 . This property holds true in the most static rent-seeking models based on the Tullock
(1980) success function (i.e., setting η =0in (4)). One may interpret η as either the prior
common winning probability of each contender before any aggressive activity is undertaken
(see Cochon, 2000), or the “degree of noise” which captures the extent of which pure luck as
opposed to appropriate eﬀorts determines success in the contest (see Amegashie, 2006). It
should be also noted that the contest success function (4) may also be interpreted as a sharing
rule or ownership of assets or outputs generated by the “productive assets” among contenders
proportional to their choices of ai.
The second restriction placed on (4) is as follows:
∂2pi
∂ai2 = r(n − 1)
n(r − 1) − 2r
n3 [ai(t)+η]





n>2 ∧ 0 <r<n / (n − 2),
(5)
which is obtained by diﬀerentiating (4) with respect to ai twice and then imposing symmetry.
Condition 0 <r<n / (n − 2) ensures the inequality in (5), implying that the r.h.s. of (10) is
concave in ai ∈ [0,1] and thus the second-order condition for an optimal choice of ai holds.9
Nevertheless, we impose a slightly more stringent condition as follows:
7Although the contest success function (4) satisﬁes axioms A1-A5 in Skaperdas (1996), it is not homogeneous
of degree one in ai (i.e., Axiom A6 of Skaperdas).
8This speciﬁcation has been also used by several authors in the rent-seeking literature including Neary
(1997), Dasgupta and Nti (1998), Amegashie (2006), and Rai and Sarin (2009). We are grateful to an anony-
mous referee for bring this contest success function to our attention.
9Tullock (1980) assumes that condition r<n / (n − 1) satisﬁes the second-order condition in his n-agent
contest game. Although Hirshleifer (1991, 1995) and Gonzalez (2007) assume that r<1 in their two-agent
games, this assumption is implied by the above second-order condition for Tullock’s model.
7Assumption 1: 0 <r<1/(n − 1).
Assumption 1 guarantees not only condition 0 <r<n / (n − 2), but also the existence of
Markov perfect Nash equilibrium strategies which will be deﬁned later.
Consider the following symmetric, stationary diﬀerential game. At each moment in time,
t, each of the contenders chooses controls, ai(t) and li(t), from its feasible set to maximize
the discounted value of total expected payoﬀs, discounted at rate ρ ∈ R++,o v e rt h ei n ﬁnite
horizon [0,∞). If all opponents of contender i use Markovian strategies aj(t)=φ
j(Z(t)),


























i(t)] − δZ(t),( 7 )
Z (0) = Z0 > 0,( 8 )
a









n(Z)) and Z0 is the initial stock.
The ﬁrst and second arguments of Γ(Z0,0) refer to the initial level of the common stock and the
time at which the game starts, respectively. The game is symmetric and stationary since the
instantaneous payoﬀ functions and feasible sets are identical among agents, and the equation
of motion (7) is common to all contenders, and since these components of the model are all
not explicitly dependent on time.
The instantaneous expected payoﬀ (or income) to contender i is given by pi (a1,...,a n)βZ.
We may view βZ (t) as a linear utility function to capture amenities from the stocks of land,
natural resources such as forests, animals and so on. Alternatively, it can be viewed that the
ﬂow of βZ (t) represents the income, return, or output generated by the “productive assets” Z,
where β represents a productivity parameter for harvest or production eﬃciency. For example,
land produces harvest: ﬁshing grounds produce ﬁshes: forests, which may be utilized for leisure
activities, yield clean air and timber production: ﬁnancial assets yield monetary returns: the
stock of knowledge (intellectual property) produces new goods (patent revenues). Maxwell
8and Reuveny (2009) have interpreted the variable Z as the pool of potential voters which
produces political power or the number of supporters βZ.
2.2 Solution Concept
We solve the diﬀerential game Γ(Z0,0) using the notion of a stationary MPE, which is ap-
pealing because, in ruling out all direct strategic interactions, it allows use of optimal control
tools. To state this concept of equilibrium in a mathematically rigorous way, we reproduce a
series of deﬁnitions given by Dockner et al. (2000) with notational modiﬁcations:
Deﬁnition 1 (Dockner et al., 2000, Deﬁnition 3.1). A control path ai :[ 0 ,∞) 7→ R+ is
feasible for the game Γ(Z0,0) if the initial value problem deﬁned by (7) − (9) has a unique,
absolutely continuous solution Z(.) such that the constraints Z(t) ∈ R+ and ai(t) ∈ [0,1] hold
for all t and the integral in (6) is well deﬁned.
As the game Γ(Z0,0) is stationary, we can focus on equilibria supported by stationary
strategies. For analytical simplicity, we further restrict ourselves to stationary Markov strate-
gies throughout the paper.
Deﬁnition 2 (Dockner et al.,2000, p.97). A stationary Markov strategy is a mapping φ
i :
R+ 7→ [0,1], so that the time path of the control is ai(t)=φ
i(Z(t)).
Hence, stationary Markov strategies are functions only of the current state. Then we can
deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 3 The n-tuple of functions (φ
1,φ
2,...,φ
n) is a stationary Markov Nash equilibrium
if for each i ∈ {1,2,..,n} an optimal control path ai(t) of the problem Γ(Z0,0) exists and is
given by the stationary Markov strategy ai(t)=φ
i(Z(t)).
We use the further strengthening of Markov Nash equilibrium, that is, subgame perfectness,
to characterize an equilibrium path:




is a Markov Nash equilibrium of the game Γ(Z0,t). The Markov Nash equilibrium is Markov
9perfect equilibrium (MPE) if for each (Z,t) ∈ R+ × [0,∞),t h es u b g a m eΓ(Z,t) admits a
Markov Nash equilibrium (ψ
1,ψ
2,...,ψ
n) such that ψ
i( ˆ Z,s)=φ
i( ˆ Z,s) for all i ∈ {1,2,...,n}
and all ( ˆ Z,s) ∈ R+ × [t,∞).
Since the subgame Γ(Z,t) is stationary, Γ(Z,0) = Γ(Z,t) and thus all stationary Markov
Nash equilibria are MPE. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 2: The value function of contender i, V i (Z)=m a x {ai(t)} Ji,φ−i
(ai(.)): R+ →
R, is locally Lipschitz continuous.
When contender i’s value function is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere,10 it solves the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
ρV

























Z (Z) represents the derivative of V i (Z) with respect to Z.






⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
=0 = ⇒ ai ∈ [0,1],
> 0= ⇒ ai =1 ,
< 0= ⇒ ai =0 .
(11)
According to (11), each contender, when choosing ai, trades the marginal increase in expected
payoﬀ from an increase in appropriation against the marginal loss in the discounted value of
the future stream of payoﬀs which results from a reduction of productive eﬀort. If the payoﬀ
gain from an increase in ai is larger than the payoﬀ loss implied by the decrease in li for all
levels of ai ∈ [0,1],t h e ni will rationally devote all resources to appropriation. In contrast,
i chooses ai =0in cases where the discounted marginal gain from productive investment
exceeds the instantaneous marginal gain from aggressive behavior for all levels of ai ∈ [0,1].
10It follows from Rademacher’s Theorem that the value function V i (Z) is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere.
Even if it is not diﬀerentiable at some point, we can apply generalized HJB function coupled with the generalized
gradient of V i (Z) (see Dockner et al. (2000), Chapter 3).
102.3 Candidate Markov Perfect Equilibrium Strategies
Since we have started our analysis assuming identical contenders and since the state equation
(7) is symmetric with respect to their controls, a natural focus is placed on symmetric equilib-
ria. The symmetry assumption allows us to drop the subscript i in the subsequent discussion,
and we will suppress this index unless strictly necessary for expositional clarity.
At an interior solution of φ(Z) we may apply the envelope theorem to characterize φ
0 (Z).











− (ρ +2 δ)
¾
(1 + η)n − δZ
.( 1 2 )
We will draw the representatives of Markov strategies in a control and state space in order
to characterize qualitative solutions to the nonlinear diﬀerential equation (12).T o t h i s e n d
we ﬁrst identify the steady state locus where ˙ Z =0in (3), called C1 in the following. Let
C2 denote the loci where φ
0 (Z) goes to plus/minus inﬁnity, and by C3 the loci where φ
0 (Z)
equals zero in the (Z,a) space:
C1 := {(Z,a): ˙ Z =( 1− φ(Z))n − δZ =0 },
C2 := {(Z,a):φ
0 (Z) → ±∞}, (13)
C3 := {(Z,a):φ
0 (Z)=0 }.
The steady-state line C1 is a downward-sloping, straight line in the (Z,a) space. It intersects
the vertical axis at point (0,1) and the horizontal axis at point (n/δ,0).T u r nt oC2. Setting
the denominator in (12) equal to zero, we obtain a vertical line at point (ZE,0) where ZE =
(1 + η)n/δ (which we call “the non-invertibility (NI) locus” following Rowat, 2007). The








r(n − 1) + η
1 − r(n − 1)
, (14)
11Figure 1: Markov strategies when r(n − 1)(ρ + δ) ≤ [1 − r(n − 1)]δ.
which, due to Assumption 1, shows that the straight line C3 has a positive slope and a
negative intercept on the vertical axis, as illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2. As a result, the point
of intersection between C2 and C3,l a b e l l e dE, will be situated in the nonnegative quadrant






r(n − 1)(ρ + δ)(1 + η)
[1 − r(n − 1)]δ
− η
¶
,( 1 5 )
which is called “a singular point”. Note, however, that point E may be located below or above
the resource constraint (1),s i n c et h ev a l u eo faE m a yo rm a yn o tb el e s st h a n1.D e p e n d i n g
on this value we can draw two diagrams such as Figs. 1 and 2. Moreover, it follows from (3)
that any strategy φ(Z) above C1 implies that Z declines in time, while any strategy φ(Z)
below C1 entails an increase of Z over time.
Collecting the arguments, we can illustrate an uncountable number of the curves corre-
sponding to the (interior) solutions satisfying the HJB equation (10) in Figs. 1 and 2. These
ﬁgures display representatives of those integral curves that are divided into ﬁve types of the
families of strategies. Arrows on the families of integral curves φj, j =1 ,...,4, and φL
illustrate the evolution of Z over time.
12Figure 2: Markov strategies when r(n − 1)(ρ + δ) > [1 − r(n − 1)]δ.
Furthermore, by direct integration of (12) and manipulating we can obtain a general solu-
tion to the diﬀerential equation (12)
φ(Z)+η =
r(n − 1)(ρ + δ)Z [(1 + η)n − δZ]
ρ+δ
δ
n[1 − r(n − 1)][(1 + η)n − δZ]
ρ+δ
δ + r(n − 1)(ρ + δ)c1
, (16)
where c1 represents an arbitrary constant of integration and may take a positive, zero or
negative value. When c1 =0 , (16) simpliﬁes to11
φL (Z)=
r(n − 1)(ρ + δ)
[1 − r(n − 1)]n
Z − η.( 1 7 )
It is seen from Figs. 1 and 2 that the left branch of the linear strategy φL (Z) to the steady
state line C1 starts from point (0,−η), and then reaches point S on C1, while its right branch
11Mino (1983), and Long and Shimomura (1998) show that in the class of diﬀerential games the value function
is homogeneous of degree α in terms of a state variable and the policy functions satisfying the corresponding
HJB equation contains a linear function of a state variable whenever the instantaneous objective function is
homogeneous of degree α and the constraints are homogeneous of degree one in terms of state and control
variables. The emergence of the linear strategy as a solution for the present model is consistent with their
ﬁnding.
13starts from any Z ∈ (ZS, ∞),t h e nr e a c h i n gp o i n tS also, where
(ZS,a S)=
µ
(1 + η)n[1 − r(n − 1)]
r(n − 1)ρ + δ
,
r(n − 1)[ρ +( 1+η)δ] − ηδ
r(n − 1)ρ + δ
¶
.( 1 8 )
Note, moreover, that the right branch of φL passes through the singular point E.
Inspection of (16) further reveals that the φ1 (resp., φ3) family of strategies represents the
solution curve of (16) when c1 > 0 and (1+η)n>δZ (resp., (1+η)n<δZ), while the φ4 (resp.,
φ2) family of strategies represents the solution curve of (16) when c1 < 0 and (1 + η)n>δZ
(resp., (1 + η)n<δZ). Moreover, all members of the left branch of the φ4 family start from
point (0, − η) as well, while no members of its right branch cross the non-invertibility locus
C2. All members of the left branch of the φ1 family also start from point (0, − η) and then
reaches points on the steady state line C1, while all members of its right branch start from
point (ZE, − η), and then reach the same point on C1. On the other hand, although the
members of the φ2 and φ3 families start from any initial value Z0 >Z E,a l lm e m b e r so ft h eφ2
family approach the horizontal axis, while all members of the φ3 family go to plus inﬁnity as
Z approaches ZE, as illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2.
As implied by Deﬁnition 4, candidate strategies must be mapped from any element of the
entire state space of Z,t h a ti s ,R+. In other words, strategies should cover the entire state
space, i.e., [0,∞).A tﬁrst glance this requirement seems to eliminate all interior strategies φj,
j =1 ,...,4,a n dφL due to the presence of the control constraint [0,1] as well as the NI
locus C2. Nevertheless, those strategies could potentially be continuously extended by the
cornered strategy φ =1along the resource constraint (1), and/or by the non-aggressive
strategy φ =0 , which has been suggested by Rowat (2007). Both potential extensions are
triggered by the cornered strategies when the equality in (11) does not apply. We use the hat






where j =1 ,..,4,
and L.
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Unfortunately, not all the extended strategies are qualiﬁed as MPE strategies deﬁned in Deﬁ-
nition 4. Dockner et al. (2000) and Rowat (2007) have provided suﬃciency conditions for the
existence of MPE. So we have to test whether those potentially extended strategies satisfy the
suﬃciency conditions in Theorem 3 of Rowat (2007).
To do this, we ﬁrst need the following lemma:
Lemma 1
(i) The value function along the cornered strategy φ =0is not bounded if φ =0possess
ac o n s t a n to fi n t e g r a t i o nc2 > 0 in the value function V (Z)=[ β(n + ρZ)/ρ(ρ + δ)n]+




(ii) it is impossible to extend either the interior strategy φ1 or φ2 by φ =0at every value of
Z that is strictly greater than nη/r(n−1)(ρ+δ), where this threshold value is located between
the two intersections of the horizontal axis with the linear strategy φL,a n dt h a tw i t hC3.
The proof is given in Appendix B. Although the strategy φ =0alone cannot form MPE
strategies, it might be possible to be joined with some of the interior strategies identiﬁed in
the previous subsection to cover the whole range of the domain of the state variable Z.
To check whether it is possible or not, we have to inspect Fig. 1 (i.e., r(n − 1)(ρ + δ) ≤
[1 − r(n − 1)]δ)a n dF i g .2( i . e . ,r(n − 1)(ρ + δ) > [1 − r(n − 1)]δ) separately. With the
help of these diagrams, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Consider the diﬀerential game Γ(Z0,0).
(i)If r(n − 1)(ρ + δ) ≤ [1 − r(n − 1)]δ, then none of the members of the ˆ φ1 and ˆ φ2 families
in Fig. 1 can form MPE strategies; and
(ii)if r(n − 1)(ρ + δ) > [1 − r(n − 1)]δ, then none of the members of the ˆ φ2 family in Fig. 2
can form MPE strategies.






in Fig. 3 of Appendix B, φ =0can be connected with the φ1 or φ4 family of strategies at the
associated value of Z ∈ [0,Z∗] in Fig. 1. However, it is not possible to extend φ1 by φ =0
15in Fig. 1. This is because although all members of the φ1 family have to be connected with
φ =0in the interval between the intersection of C1 with the horizontal axis and ZE, φ =0is
not qualiﬁed as an optimal solution at any point in that interval due to Lemma 1. Moreover,
it follows from Lemma 1 that it is also impossible to extend the φ2 family by φ =0in Figs. 1
and 2. Taken together, the families ˆ φ1 and ˆ φ2 both violate condition (i) of Theorem 3 of Rowat
(2007) in which the n-tuple of the solution paths is feasible for Γ(Z0,0).
Nevertheless, it is seen from Fig. 2 that it might be possible to extend some of the φ1
family of strategies by another corner strategy φ(Z)=1 , labelled φ =1 . Although the
interior strategy φ4 cannot intersect the NI locus C2, it may be also possible to extend φ4
by φ =1 . To check these possibilities, we need the following lemma (its proof is given in
Appendix B):
Lemma 3
(i) The value function along the cornered strategy φ =1is not upper bounded if φ =1possess a








(ii) it is impossible to extend either the interior strategy φ1, φ3 or φ4 by φ =1at every value
of Z which is strictly less than ZC ≡ (1 + η)n/r(n − 1)(ρ +2 ρ).
Moreover, it follows from Figs. 3 and 4 in Appendix B that φ =1eventually becomes a
solution for larger values of Z (more precisely, which are larger than the l.h.s. of (B.7)). This
seems to be quite intuitive because when the existing stock Z is abundant (i.e., larger than
this threshold value), contenders have a stronger incentive to capture the stock from others
through appropriation activity rather than to engage in production activity, thus devoting to
full-ﬁghting φ =1 .
Lemma 4 None of the members of the ˆ φ3 and ˆ φ4 families can form MPE strategies.
Proof. Although in Fig. 1 all members of the φ4 family intersect the constraint a =1(i.e.,
φ =1 ), none of them can intersect the NI locus C2. On the other hand, since it follows from
L e m m a3t h a tφ =1remains an optimal solution only when Z>Z C, it is seen from Fig. 1
that it is impossible to extend φ4 by φ =1 .
16In Fig. 2, all members of the φ4 family intersect the constraint a =1(i.e., φ =1 )a t
the points whose values of Z are strictly less than ZL.S i n c e ZC >Z L in Fig. 2, it is also
impossible to continuously extend φ4 by φ =1 .
Since any members of the φ3 family in Fig. 2 intersect neither C2 nor the constraint a =1 ,
any extension of φ3 is not possible. In contrast, in Fig. 1 there exist some members of the
φ3 family which intersect the constraint a =1at the points whose values of Z are strictly
larger than ZC. In this case, they have to cross φ =1again at a value of Z w h i c hi sl e s st h a n
ZC. However, it follows from Lemma 3 that at this intersection φ =1is no longer an optimal
solution. To sum up, any members of the families φ3 and φ4 cannot be continuously extended
by φ =1 , thus violating condition (i) of Theorem 3 of Rowat (2007).
In spite of those eliminations, there still remain the linear strategy φL and some of the φ1
family of strategies as candidate MPE ones. These strategies may be extended by φ =1 .T h i s
conjecture will be conﬁrmed in our main proposition as follows:
Proposition 1 Consider the diﬀerential game Γ(Z0,0).
(i) If r(n − 1)(ρ + δ) ≤ [1 − r(n − 1)]δ, then only the linear strategy extended by φ(Z)=0
and φ(Z)=1forms a MPE strategy; and
(ii) if r(n − 1)(ρ + δ) > [1 − r(n − 1)]δ, then only the non-linear strategy of the φ1 family
extend by φ(Z)=0and φ(Z)=1at ZC ≡ (1 + η)n/r(n − 1)(ρ +2 ρ) forms a MPE strategy.
There are several remarks in order. First, Proposition 1 implies not only that the linear
(singular) and nonlinear (non-singular) MPE strategies qualiﬁed above, labelled ˆ φL and ˆ φ
∗
1,
are asymptotically stable in the sense that from any arbitrary initial value of Z they can reach
ﬁnite steady states in the long run. Proposition 1 also says that there always exists either
of the two extended strategies, depending on the parameter values of the model. It is then
best understood that the uniqueness of MPE strategies arises from the stringent requirement
that the domain of a state variable should be deﬁned over the entire state space, i.e., [0, ∞).
Although the emergence of a unique steady state in our model is similar to the results of
Hirshleifer (1991, 1995) and Skaperdas (1992) using a static contest model but also from those
of Maxwell and Reuveny (2005) using a dynamic model with myopic agents in which the
17unique one-shot Nash equilibrium is repeated every period, the reasons for the uniqueness of
equilibrium are quite diﬀerent between their models and ours; that is, the uniqueness property
of their model is due to strict concave objectives, while our uniqueness property arises from
the deﬁning characteristic for the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium.
Secondly, although “partial cooperation” in the steady state is also found in the static
models of Hirshleifer and Skaperdas, diﬀerent degrees of “partial cooperation” depend on
which strategy is qualiﬁed for MPE strategies in our diﬀerential game. If the nonlinear MPE
strategy is qualiﬁed, a more eﬃcient steady state will be realized compared to the linear one.
This feature does not emerge in the corresponding static contest models, because there is no
distinction between linear and nonlinear strategies in their models. Notably, the more eﬀective
the conﬂict technology, the less patient the contenders, the larger the number of contenders
or the greater the rate of depreciation, the less likely that the linear strategy is chosen as a
MPE one; instead, the more likely that a more eﬃcient nonlinear strategy is qualiﬁed as a
MPE one.
Thirdly, another important aspect of Proposition 1 is that an optimal choice of appropri-
ation activity varies according to the size of the common stock Z (=the prize) that changes
over time, which stands in contrast with the results based on the above-mentioned static con-
test models where the size of the prize is constant through time. When Z =0 , there is no
incentive for each contender to engage in appropriation activity because they get nothing from
this activity, so that all contenders choose the non-aggressive strategy φ =0 . As a result, the
common stock of Z is accumulating over time. When the initial stock level is relatively low,
investment in aggressive behavior monotonically increases toward the steady state point S
over time. In other words, the contenders will become greedier, as the common-pool stock Z
gets larger over time, because the marginal gain of appropriation will be higher. These fea-
tures apparently have not been addressed by Hirshleifer and Skaperdas because due to the
static nature of their models there does not exist a state variable. The primary driving force
is that the best-reply strategies irrespective of linear or non-linear ones display strategic com-
plements in such a way that when a contender increases his or her appropriation eﬀort, the
other contenders also increase their appropriation eﬀorts.
18In the long run, every contender chooses to contribute to the production of the common-
pool stock Z to some extent. In other words, (implicit) “partial cooperation” can be seen as
a best response to the risk of appropriation. In aﬄuent economies, on the other hand, where
the initial level of the common-pool stock is suﬃciently large, investment in aggression reaches
the maximum possible level (i.e., φ =1 )i nﬁnite time. In other words, since there is initially
a large amount of the common-pool stock in aﬄuent economies, a full-ﬁghting strategy will
be rationally and inevitably chosen during the transition to the steady state until the stock
decreases to a certain level.
4 Comparative Static Analysis
4.1 Steady State Eﬀects
In this section we discuss the eﬀects of a change in the model parameters on the transition
path of the linear strategy φL as well as on the associated long-run equilibrium point S,s i n c e
the other nonlinear MPE strategy displays the same comparative statics properties. Consider
ﬁrst the eﬀects of a change in the productivity (or eﬀectiveness) of conﬂict technology. In the
model, a change in the productivity is captured by a change in r.T h es h i f to fp o i n tS can be
calculated by diﬀerentiating (18) with respect to the parameter r, respectively:
daS
dr




= −(1 + η)n(n − 1)(ρ + δ)∆
−2 < 0,
where ∆ ≡ r(n − 1)ρ + δ > 0. Although an increase in r does not aﬀect C1, this increase
strengthens the intensity of appropriation associated with every level of the common-pool
stock Z during the transition path, thus making the linear strategy φL steeper. Since the
productivity of appropriation becomes more eﬀective with higher r, all competing agents
engage in more aggressive behavior in the hope of capturing more resources. This ﬁnding is
quite intuitive, and is also consistent with the static conﬂict models of Hirshleifer (1991, 1995).
As an increase in the number of contenders augments the aggregate endowment in pro-
19portion to n, more resources will be available to production and appropriation activities,
which is captured by an outward shift of the aggregate resource constraint C1.O nt h eo t h e r
hand, the larger number of contenders will enhance the intensity of contest among contenders,
thereby intensifying each contender’s aggressive behavior and thus making the linear strat-
egy φL steeper. Hence, these two eﬀects together intensify individual appropriation, while the
long run eﬀect on the common-pool stock Z is ambiguous since the increase in endowment
interacts with the intensiﬁed aggressive behavior of contenders:12
daS
dn




=( 1 + η)
£





A higher depreciation rate causes a reduction in the level of the common-pool stock Z
available to contenders, thereby discouraging appropriation. This resource-extraction eﬀect
causes a clockwise turn of C1 around point (0,1) (i.e., the aggregate resource constraint C1
moves inward toward the origin). At the same time, a higher δ implies that the cost of
reproducing the common-pool stock increases more than the cost of aggressive behavior. Since
this strengthens an incentive for aggressive behavior, φL gets steeper. Although these two
eﬀects on appropriation operate in opposite directions, the following result indicates that the
former eﬀect will outweigh the latter eﬀect in the long run:
daS
dδ




= −(1 + η)n[1 − r(n − 1)]∆
−2 < 0.
A decrease of the subjective rate of time preference makes φL steeper, but it has no eﬀect
on C1. Hence we obtain the following long run eﬀects:
daS
dρ




= −(1 + η)r(n − 1)n[1 − r(n − 1)]∆
−2 < 0.
12This eﬀect has been also found in Result 4B of Hirshleifer (1995).
20The economic explanation is that as contenders become more patient (i.e., smaller ρ), they
put more weight on future stocks of durable goods rather than the current one, and thus tend
to spend more resources on production activity rather than on aggressive investment. This
result has apparently not been addressed by Hirshleifer (1991, 1995) and Skaperdas (1992),
who have used the static conﬂict models. It stands in contrast to Skaperdas and Syropoulos’
(1996) result in which the higher is the valuation of the future (i.e., smaller ρ), the stronger
is the intensity of ﬁghting. The reason for this diﬀerence is that in their two-period model
contender’s ﬁrst-period expenditure on appropriation increases his or her second-period payoﬀ.
Rather, our result is similar to Garﬁnkel’s (1990) Folk Theorem type result in repeated games
where a lower discount factor (i.e., a smaller ρ) makes it easier to sustain cooperative outcomes.
An interpretation of our result is that long-sighted contenders become less aggressive because
they are more concerned about the future, i.e., the future beneﬁts resulting fromc o o p e r a t i o n .
Finally, increasing the degree of noise mitigates the intensity of long-run contests:
daS
dη




=[ 1 − r(n − 1)]δ∆
−1 > 0,
which accords with intuition. That is, a larger extent of pure luck (i.e., η) discourages an
incentive of aggressive behavior, because its increases lowers the marginal increase in the
probability of wining with respect to i’s aggressive eﬀort.
We may then summarize the discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 2
(i) An increase in the eﬀectiveness of aggression leads to a higher level of aggression and to a
lower level of the common-pool stock (i.e., daS/dr > 0 and dZS/dr < 0);
(ii) an increase in the number of contenders leads to a higher level of aggression, but the eﬀect
on the common-pool stock is ambiguous (i.e., daS/dn > 0 and dZS/dn R 0);
(iii) an increase in the depreciation rate leads to lower levels of aggression and of the common-
pool stock (i.e., daS/dδ < 0 and dZS/dδ < 0);
(iv)a decrease in the subjective rate of time preference (i.e., contenders become more pa-
21tient) leads to a lower level of aggression andt oah i g h e rl e v e lo ft h ec o m m o n - p o o ls t o c k
(i.e., daS/dρ > 0 and dZS/dδ < 0); and
(v)an increase in the degree of noise leads to a lower level of aggression and to a higher level
of the common-pool stock (i.e., daS/dη < 0 and dZS/dη > 0).
4.2 First-Best Solution
In this subsection, we will characterize the explicit cooperative (ﬁrst-best) solution as a bench-
mark steady state in the following. Assume an outside enforcer or centralized agency has the
power to enforce every contender to execute its command. The cooperative strategy is one
for which a centralized agency chooses the inﬁnite-horizon planning proﬁle of strategy a ∈ Rn
+
at the outset of the game so as to maximize
R ∞
0 Ze−ρtdt subject to ˙ Z = n −
Pn
j=1 aj − δZ
where aj (t) ∈ [0,1] for all j. Clearly, this optimization gives rise to a totally peaceful solution,
that is, aj (t)=0for t ∈ [0,∞) and all j, which leads to the most eﬃcient long-run outcome
(0,n/δ). The result is understood by noting that an enforced peaceful resolution completely
eliminates socially wasteful aggressive activity if a central agency is strong enough to directly
control the allocation between production and appropriation. Based on this observation, we
can see that making the steady state level of Z closer to the Pareto eﬃcient one leads to the
higher total discounted value of expected payoﬀs.
These results should be interpreted against the insight from Section 2 that a socially ef-
ﬁcient steady state is not self-enforcing for it does not usually constitute a subgame perfect
(Nash) equilibrium. Nevertheless, the results are suggestive in the sense that even weak gov-
ernments which cannot fully control private agents might attempt to deter the development
of the conﬂict technology, to increase the “noise degree” in the conﬂict technology, to reduce
the depreciation rate of common-pool assets or to induce people to have longer sight. Such
structural or institutional reforms could reduce the likelihood of aggression and thus avoid
socially waste of resources, leading to peaceful and more eﬃcient outcomes in the long run.
The nuclear nonproliferation treaty which deters the development of nuclear weapons (i.e., ag-
gressive conﬂicting technology) would be socially desirable in a way that makes the long run
22outcome resulting from the non-cooperative equilibrium behavior closer to the peaceful and
eﬃcient one.
Even in an anarchic situation where every contender follows the Markov perfect equilibrium
behavior described in Sections 2 and 3, a decrease in either the productivity of aggressiveness,
the depreciation rate, or the subjective rate of time preference moves the resulting long run
equilibrium closer to the ﬁrst-best one.
Another example is patent law, which aims at enforcing property rights on investment
return and thus makes anarchic situations closer to the ﬁrst-best one by restricting socially
wasteful activities. Patent law potentially prevents a rapid fall in the expected return from
new innovation, which would be a consequence of imitation by rivals. The increase in the
return on investment caused by secure property rights may be approximately captured by the
eﬀect of a lower depreciation rate in our model.
5 Conclusions
The ﬁrst message of this paper is that completely aggressive behavior is not necessarily a ratio-
nal strategy for a contender in anarchic situations. Rather, every contender will individually
and voluntarily choose “partial cooperation”, in which each contender devotes its individual
resource both to productive and appropriation activities at the same time, even though con-
tenders act fully rational and are guided by their self-interest. The primary driving force is
the durability of the common-pool stock in conjunction with the forward looking behavior of
contenders. These intrinsically dynamic ingredients induce every contender to behave partially
cooperatively, even without punishments and threats, unlike Garﬁnkel (1990). In other words,
either if the stock depreciates completely each period or if contenders have myopic foresight,
they are less motivated to follow a cooperative behavior in producing a commonly-accessible
good.
The second major ﬁnding is that even if nonlinear Markov strategies are available, there is a
unique MPE strategy. This result is in sharp contrast with the results of Dockner and van Long
(1993), and Rowat (2007) which provide multiplicity of equilibrium strategies and uncountable
23many long run equilibria including the better outcomes supported by the nonlinear MPE
strategies. However, it remains an open question as to the extent to which this uniqueness
result of our model is model-speciﬁco rr o b u s tu n d e rd i ﬀerent contest success, production
or/and objective functions.
The model presented in this paper should be developed further in several directions. In
particular, introducing asymmetry among agents would enable us to compare the results of the
present model with those static models which do incorporate asymmetric agents. The “paradox
of power” (Hirshleifer, 1991) — the relatively less well-endowed agents improve their position
compared with their better-endowed counterparts — may be generated in such an asymmetric
dynamic conﬂict model. Another interesting research agenda is to investigate non-Markovian
equilibria supported by history-dependent strategies such as trigger ones in the present conﬂict
model, which might support multiple and more eﬃcient, peaceful equilibria (see Benhabib and
Radner, 1992).
Appendix A: Derivation of Equation (12)
In this appendix we show how to derive (12) in the text. Assuming an interior solution, we
solve (11) for each contender to get the optimal strategy ai = φ
i (Z). By substituting this
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iβ.( A . 3 )
Substituting (11) and (A.3) into V i
Z (Z) and V i
ZZ (Z) in (A.2), respectively, and using symme-
try, we obtain



























iβ [n(1 − φ(Z)) − δZ] − (δ + ρ)
∂pi
∂φ
iβZ, k 6= i. (A.4)



















i2 = r(n − 1)






r2 (−n +2 )
n3[φ(Z)+η]2, (A.5)
we substitute those expressions into (A.4) to obtain
0=
n − 1















Further rearranging (A.6) gives rise to (12) in the text.
25Appendix B: Proofs of Lemma 1, 2 and Proposition 1
To prove the existence of MPE we apply suﬃciency conditions stated in Theorem 3 of Rowat
(2007). Although it may be appropriate to distinguish between the value functions associated
the candidate MPE strategies and qualiﬁed MPE strategies, it is omitted for the sake of
notational simplicity.




βZ + VZ (Z)[n − δZ]. (B.1)









Note that when c2 6=0 , lim
Z→n/δ
V (Z)=±∞. This contradicts the bounded value function,
which will be shown below. Since it is clearly seen from (7) and the bounded control constraint
on ai(t) (i.e., the time-invariant interval [0,1] for ∀t ∈ [0,∞)) that the cornered strategy φ =0
brings about the convergence of Z(t) toward a ﬁnite and constant value of Z on the steady state
line C1, so does the instantaneous objective function in (6). With a positive discount factor
(i.e., ρ > 0), therefore, the value function in (6) is bounded (since the its lower boundedness
is trivially satisﬁed).
Following Rowat (2007), by choosing c2 appropriately, it may be possible to extend the
interior strategy φ1, φ2 or φ4 by φ =0 . To see this, setting φ =0for ∂pi/∂ai in (A.5) to
obtain (∂pi/∂ai)βZ ≡ r(n − 1)βZ/n2η, the auxiliary condition (∂pi/∂ai)βZ ≤ V 0
i (Z) allows











(ρ + δ)r(n − 1)
¸
if (n − δZ)
ρ+δ
δ > 0, (B.3)
whereas the opposite inequality holds if (n − δZ)
ρ+δ
δ < 0.C o n s i d e ra ﬁrst case (i.e., (B.3)).
Let the r.h.s. of (B.3) denote Ψ(Z) with Ψ(0) = −βn
ρ
δ/ρ(ρ + δ) < 0.D i ﬀerentiating Ψ(Z)
26Figure 3: Transitions between the corner and interior solutions












n[η + r(n − 1)]
r(n − 1)(ρ +2 δ)
¾
.( B . 4 )
Let Z∗ denote the value of Z at which the curly braces on the r.h.s. of (B.4) equals zero and
thus the function Ψ(Z) achieves its local maximum, where
Z
∗ =
n[η + r(n − 1)]
r(n − 1)(ρ +2 δ)
.
Note also that Z∗ equals the value of Z at the intersection of C3 with the horizontal axis in
Figs. 1 and 2, and Z∗ <n / δ. Taken together, we can draw the graph of Ψ(Z) as a real line
in Fig.3.
Inspection of Fig.3 reveals the following facts. First, if c2 > 0 is chosen, the value function
in (B.2) becomes unbounded as Z → δ/n because (B.3) is eventually satisﬁed and so φ =0
remains a solution at Z = δ/n.13 Secondly, when c2 < −n
ρ
δβ/ρ(ρ + δ) is chosen, φ =0is
disqualiﬁed as an optimal solution for every value of Z ∈ [0,∞), so that either the interior
strategy φ1, φ2 or φ4 must be chosen; however, none of them can cross the NI locus C2.A s
13In the second case (i.e., (n − δZ)
ρ+δ
δ < 0), the graph of Ψ(Z) is the same as that under (n − δZ)
ρ+δ
δ > 0
when Z<n / δ, while it is declining in Z when Z>n / δ (the latter part of Ψ(Z) is illustrated as a dotted line
in Fig.3). Inspection of Fig.3 reveals that when c2 > 0, the corner strategy φ =0still remains a solution in
the neighborhood of Z = n/δ, which leads to the unbounded value function.






in Fig.3, φ =0c a nb es w i t c h e dt oa
member of the family φ4 or φ1 at some value of Z ∈ [0, ηn/r(n − 1)(ρ + δ)] associated with
their intersection.




βZ + VZ (Z)(−δZ). (B.5)








Note that when c3 6=0 , lim
Z→0
V (Z)=∞, which contradicts the bounded value function. This
can readily be shown by the fact that the feasible path of Z(t) always converges from any
Z ∈ [0,∞) to a ﬁnite and constant value of Z on the steady state line C1, as in the proof of
Lemma 1.
A sb e f o r e ,w eh a v et oc h o o s ec3 appropriately in order to extend either the interior strategy
φ2, φ3 or φ4 by φ =0 . To do this, setting φ =1for ∂pi/∂ai in (A.5) to obtain (∂pi/∂ai)βZ ≡
r(n − 1)βZ/n2(1+η), the auxiliary condition (∂pi/∂ai)βZ ≥ V i
Z (Z) allows the solution φ =1















≤ c3.( B . 7 )
For expositional purposes, we denote by Φ(Z) the l.h.s. of (B.7). As the exponent of the ﬁrst
term on the l.h.s. of (B.7) is smaller than that of the second, it dominates for smaller values
of Z,w h i l ef o rl a r g e rZ the second term dominates the ﬁrst one. Hence, the graph of Φ(Z)
has the maximum at ZC = n(1 + η)/r(n − 1)(ρ +2 δ) (which also corresponds to the value of
Z at the intersection of C3 with the resource constraint a =1in Figs. 1 and 2). Put together,
we can draw the inverted U-shape graph of Φ(Z) as illustrated in Figs.4 and 5. When c3 > ¯ c3
is chosen, it follows from (B.6) that V (Z) → +∞ as Z → 0,s i n c eΦ(Z)=1satisﬁes (B.7) for
every value of Z ∈ [0,∞), thus eliminating this case.
28Figure 4: Transitions between the corner and interior solutions when ZL >Z C.
Proof of Proposition 1. First, we ﬁrst consider Fig. 1. If any value of c3 is less than
cL
3 in Fig.4, φ =1has to be connected with the interior strategy φ2 which always crosses the
horizontal axis at a value of Z lying on the right side of ZE. However, an extension by φ =0
is not possible because φ =0is not an optimal solution at that intersection point due to (ii)





in Fig.4, φ =1has to be connected with
φ3 in Fig. 1. However, this extension cannot cover the whole domain of Z because the family
φ3 of strategies never crosses the NI locus C2.
When c3 precisely equals cL
3, the cornered strategy φ =1is connected with the linear strat-
egy φL, which can intersect the NI locus C2. Moreover, since φL intersects with the horizontal
axis at a value of Z w h i c hi sl e s st h a nt h a ta tt h ei n t e r s e c t i o no fC3 and the horizontal axis.




such that φ =1can be connected
with φL at the value of Z associated with the chosen c2. As a result, the extended strategy
ˆ φL(Z) can continuously cover the whole range of the domain.
Next, consider Fig. 2. If c3 is chosen such that c3 < ¯ c3 in Fig.5, φ =1h a st ob ec o n n e c t e d
with an interior strategy at a value of Z>Z C. However, an extension by φ2 is not possible for
the same reason stated above. Only when c3 =¯ c3 is chosen, there exists a unique member of
the family φ1, labeled φ
∗
1, that can be connected with φ =1at ZC where the interior strategy
φ
∗
1 is tangent to the constraint a =1as illustrated in Fig. 2. This is because φ =1still remains
an optimal solution at ZC d u et o( i i )i nL e m m a3 .H o w e v e r ,o t h e rm e m b e r so ft h ef a m i l yφ1
29Figure 5: Transitions between the corner and interior solutions when ZL <Z C.
cannot be extended by φ =1 . The reason is as follows. To connect φ =1with the members
of the family φ1 lying on the left side of φ
∗
1,w eh a v et oc h o o s ec3 less than ¯ c3 in Fig.5, which
leads φ =1to connect with either the family φ2 or the members of the family φ1 lying on the
right side of φ
∗
1 in Fig.2; however, either extension is not possible.
In addition, the strategy φ
∗
1 can be extended by φ =0 ,s i n c eφ =0remains a solution at
the intersection of φ
∗
1 with the horizontal axis due to (ii) in Lemma 1. Taken together, the
unique strategy φ
∗
1 can be continuously extended by φ =0and φ =1to the whole space of
the domain of Z.
Therefore, the only two extensions, ˆ φL and ˆ φ
∗
1, satisfy condition (i) of Theorem 3 of Rowat
(2007). Although we further need to conﬁrm that both strategies satisfy conditions (ii)-(iv)
in Theorem 3 of Rowat, we will not repeat it here, since the rest of the proof proceeds by exactly
following his proof.
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